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Abstract 
In this paper I present a new perspective for interpreting the wavefunction as a non-material, non-
epistemic, non-representational entity.  I endorse a functional view according to which the wavefunction 
is defined by its roles in the theory. I argue that this approach shares some similarities with the nomological 
account of the wave function as well as with the pragmatist and epistemic approaches to quantum theory, 
while avoiding the major objections of these alternatives.   
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1 Introduction  
 
The wavefunction seems to play a crucial role in quantum mechanics: the Schrödinger 
equation is an equation for the temporal evolution of wavefunction. Moreover, the 
probabilities of measurement results are provided by the Born rule, which is usually 
expressed in terms of the wavefunction. In the context of realist approaches to quantum 
mechanics, these reasons provide an excellent rationale for endorsing wavefunction 
realism, the view that the wavefunction should be seen as representing a quantum state, 
i.e. a material field or physical entity. However, for a variety of reasons, other realist 
approaches reject the idea that the wavefunction represents matter in this way. One 
such perspective is given by the primitive ontology approach, according to which the 
wavefunction should be understood as a law of nature. Other realist attitudes following 
this lead, such as for instance the information-theoretic interpretation, have instead 
proposed that the wavefunction is epistemic. Furthermore, there are pragmatist 
approaches, in which the wavefunction is taken to be prescriptive about the 
experimenter’s expectation of a given phenomenon.  In this paper I start from the 
assumption that the wavefunction does not represent something physical, following the 
ideas of the approaches mentioned above, and contra wavefunction realism. All these 
 
1 I am especially grateful to Mario Hubert for his thoughtful comments on a previous version of this 
paper and in particular for the suggestion of the name of the view. Also, I wish to thank the participants 
of the 2020 Central APA meeting, the 2020 PSA meeting, and the Harvard Foundations of Physics 




views face major challenges. My goal is to explore whether it is possible to construct an 
account of the wavefunction (understood as not representational), which is less problematical 
than the alternatives. The result is a view, which I dubbed wave-functionalism, that is 
functionalist: following the pragmatists, the wavefunction is not defined in terms of 
what it represents but rather in terms of the functions it plays, so that the wavefunction is 
as the wavefunction does.  
 
This is the structure of the paper. In Section 2 I overview the motivations and the most 
serious problems of the various views about the nature of the wavefunction. I start in 
the first subsection reviewing wavefunction realism, then I discuss the primitive 
ontology program, and finally I move to epistemic and pragmatic interpretations. Next, 
in Section 3 I present my view, wave-functionalism. I begin by reviewing the main ideas 
of functionalist approaches, and then I outline the different roles the wavefunction 
plays, comparing and contrasting wave-functionalism with the other approaches. Then 
I discuss the advantages of my view over the alternatives, and I anticipate possible 
objections to wave-functionalism and proposing some replies.  The last section 
summarizes the main ingredients of my proposal. 
2 What is the Wavefunction? 
 
Scientific realists ask: what is the quantum world like? Opening physics books, a 
mathematical entity and an equation stand out: the wavefunction and its evolution 
equation, namely the Schrödinger equation. So, one natural thought is to take this object 
as describing the fundamental ontology. In this section I review the major realist 
approaches to the status and the nature of the wavefunction as well as their most 
challenging problems.  
 
2.1 Wavefunction Realism: The Wavefunction Represents a Material Field     
Given that the wavefunction appears in the theory’s most fundamental equation and in 
the rules used to make predictions, a reasonable attitude seems to think of the 
wavefunction as representing matter. However, as emphasized by Schrödinger himself 
(1935), this is problematical for at least two reasons. For one, the cat problem: if the 
wavefunction is a physical field, then there are macroscopic superpositions that we 
actually do not observe. Realist solutions of the cat problem include the pilot-wave 
theory,2 the spontaneous localization theory,3 and the many-worlds theory.4 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a further problem, sometimes dubbed the configuration 
 
2 de Broglie (1928), Bohm (1952). 
3 Girardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). 
4 Everett (1957). 
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space problem. The wavefunction of the universe is defined over a 3𝑛𝑛 dimensional 
configuration space, where 𝑛𝑛 is the apparent total number of particles. So, how can we 
interpret the wavefunction as something physically vibrating? Unlike the cat problem, 
the configuration space problem is more controversial.5 Some deny there is a deep 
problem and embrace wavefunction realism, 6 according to which there is a new material 
field, sometimes called the quantum state, which the wavefunction mathematically 
represents. Then, wavefunction realists propose ways in which three-dimensional 
particles, as well as macroscopic objects, are suitably emergent from the field in the 
high-dimensional configuration space.7  
 
Wavefunction realism, which was also motivated by the desire of keeping the theory 
local (even if only in configuration space),8 has been criticized on grounds that the 
existence of a wave or field in a high-dimensional space is more problematical than the 
wavefunction realists are willing to admit. Some have argued that configuration space 
is an artificial construct, since there are no particles at the fundamental level and thus 
the introduction of such a space lacks justification.9 Also, some have argued that the 
view is too revisionary: since configuration space is high-dimensional, the explanation 
of the macroscopic world has to be heavily revised when compared to the classical 
understanding.10 Others have maintained that wavefunction realism makes the role of 
spacetime in the theory obscure, and it is difficult to extend to quantum field theories.11 
While wavefunction realists are actively working on solving these challenges, 12 some 
have instead proposed alternative views, which have in common that the idea that the 
wavefunction is still a material field, but not in configuration space.13 However, even if 
promising, arguably these approaches still face some difficulties.14   
 
5 See Albert and Ney (2013) for a review of the different approaches to it. 
6 See most notably Albert (1996, 2015), Ney (forthcoming), North (2013), and references therein. 
7 See Albert (2015) and Ney (forthcoming) for two different approaches on this.  
8 Ney (forthcoming) and references therein. 
9 “It seems a little paradoxical to construct a configuration space with the coordinates of points which do 
not exist.” de Broglie (1928) translated in Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009) p. 380. 
10 Monton (2013), Allori (2013). 
11 See Wallace and Timpson (2010), Myrvold (2015). 
12 See Chen (2019) and references therein for more objections.  
13 One view considers the wavefunction as a three-dimensional poly-wave or multi-field which assigns 
values to regions of points (Forrest 1988, Belot 2012, Chen 2017, Hubert and Romano 2018). Another 
possibility is primitivism: the wavefunction represents an unanalyzable, nonlocal, material field (Maudlin 
2019). Others have tried to reformulate quantum theory only in terms of local ‘beables’ (Norsen 2010), 
while spacetime state realism associates to each system a determinate property represented by a reduced 
density matrix (Wallace and Timpson 2010).  
14Allori (2018) has objected that the multi-field view is unable to account for symmetries, while 




Be that as it may, presumably driven by these challenges, others have taken the radical 
view of eliminating, one way or the other, the wavefunction from the material ontology 
of the theory. In other words, the wavefunction does not describe matter: the 
wavefunction does not represent some new and peculiar material field which needs to 
be added to ‘the furniture of the world.’ Different approaches spell out what the 
wavefunction is in different ways, but they all agree that there is no material, physical 
quantum state the wavefunction mathematically represents. I wish to focus on this type 
of approach, and on the following question: what is the best way of thinking of the 
wavefunction, if it is not representing a material field?  I articulate an answer to this 
question in Section 3, after having overviewed the main non-material theories of the 
wavefunction, their motivations, and their challenges in the remainder of this section.   
 
2.2 Primitive Ontology: The Wavefunction Represents a Nomological Fact 
Among those who find the configuration space problem serious enough to conclude 
that the wavefunction does not represent a material field, one finds the primitive 
ontology approach.15  This view constitutes a realist approach to quantum theory, just 
like wavefunction realism. In contrast with it, however, it assumes that the fundamental 
ontology of matter is given by microscopic entities in three-dimensional space, or four-
dimensional space-time: particles, fields, strings, spatio-temporal events (flashes). These 
entities constitute the primitive ontology of the theory, as opposed to the other variables 
present in the theory which do not represent matter, including the wavefunction. One 
popular way of thinking about the wavefunction in this framework is that it represents 
a law of nature. In other words, the quantum state is not material, but it is nomological. 
The main idea behind this nomological approach is captured by the popular slogan: ’the 
primitive ontology specifies what matter is, the wavefunction tells matter how to 
move.’16 The central motivation for this nomological view of the wavefunction lies in 
the fact that the wavefunction, having a nomological role, is able to compositionally and 
dynamically explain why phenomena happen. This type of explanation is the one that 
kinetic theory provides of the laws of thermodynamics: gases are composed of 
Newtonian particles, and one explains, say, why gases expand when heated given the 
dynamics of their fundamental particles. Analogously, in the primitive ontology 
approach the observed macroscopic properties and the behavior of the macroscopic 
objects of our experience are explained in terms of these macroscopic objects being 
 
serious technical challenges (Norsen 2010), and Maudlin (2019) has objected that the reduced density 
matrix proposed by spacetime state realists inverts the usual relation between parts and wholes because it 
is not separable. 
15 Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka, and Zanghì (2008), Allori (2013).  
16 Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì (2013), Goldstein and Zanghì (2013). 
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composed by the microscopic primitive ontology, whose evolution is dynamically 
governed by a law defined in terms of the wavefunction.17   
 
What is considered by many the most serious problem of this view is that the 
wavefunction does not look like a law of nature. First, laws are time-independent 
entities, while the wavefunction evolves in time.18 Primitive ontologists have replied 
that even if the wavefunction is time-dependent in the current theory, it may turn out 
not to be so in a future theory of quantum gravity.19 However, some may still find this 
type of reply not very satisfactory, as one would want to know what the wavefunction 
is in the current theory without having to wait for a future theory.20 Alternatively, one 
could reverse the argument and maintain that if our intuitions about what a law of 
nature, for instance time-independence, are at odds with the theory, then we should 
reject our intuitions.21 
Another problem for the nomological approach is that, unlike laws, the wavefunction is 
not unique, as two wavefunctions may give rise to the same empirical predictions. To 
this challenge, one could reply that lack of uniqueness does not speak against the 
wavefunction being a law, as one could have different formulations of the same law, 
with different mathematical objects. However, this is controversial, as others have 
questioned that they are truly the same law.22  
 
Be that as it may, to overcome these problems, people have proposed alternative ways 
of spelling out the idea that the wavefunction mathematically represent a nomological 
fact.23 However, while these are interesting proposals, there is still work to be done as it 
is not straightforward how to implement the details, or uncontroversially respond to 
objections.24 
 
17 Allori (2013).  
18 Brown and Wallace (2005).  
19 Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì (1997), Goldstein and Teufel (2001), Goldstein and Zanghì (2013).  
20 Wallace, p.c.; Albert, p.c.. 
21 Callender (2015) 
22 Maudlin, p.c. See also subsection 3.5, objection 3. For more objections, see Belot (2012), Callender (2015), 
Esfeld et al. (2014), Suárez (2015).  
23 These proposals have been developed in a Humean framework (see Callender 2015, Esfeld 2014, Miller 
2014, Bhogal and Perry 2017). A connected nomological approach is to think of the wavefunction as a 
dispositional property, or more generally as a property of the primitive ontology (Monton 2013; see also 
Esfeld et al. 2014, and Suàrez 2015 for the development of this approach in the framework of Bohmian 
mechanics). Other approaches that seems to belong to the same camp are structuralist accounts (North 
2013). 
24 Many find the Humean accounts wanting, partly because they find Humeanism with respect to laws 
misguided for other reasons. Moreover, some others consider find the property approach to the 




So, the question is the following: assuming one does not want to think of the 
wavefunction as representing material objects, can we do better than the nomological 
approach in accounting for the nature of a non-material wavefunction? In the next section I 
discuss the epistemic interpretations. The main idea there is to reject the ontic 
representational status of the wavefunction (proper of wavefunction realism) in favor of 
an epistemic one: the wavefunction does not represent something objective in the 
system under investigation; rather it represents our best knowledge of it. This 
framework is interesting as it provides an example of a realist approach which explains 
the phenomena in a distinctive way, which differs from the one proposed by the 
primitive ontology program.  
 
2.3 Epistemic Interpretations: The Wavefunction Represents Our Knowledge  
As in the primitive ontology approach, in these interpretations the wavefunction does 
not represent any material quantum state. However, while in the primitive ontology 
approach the wavefunction expresses a nomological fact, here it is epistemic: it 
represents our incomplete knowledge of the system and, by appearing in the Born rule, 
it determines our expectations about measurement outcomes.25 
 
In virtue of being epistemic, these approaches have received many criticisms, most 
prominently that they cannot account for interference phenomena, and that they violate 
an important no-go theorem. This theorem, called PBR theorem from the initials of the 
authors,26 is taken to show that, in line of the strategy used by the other no-go theorems, 
epistemic interpretations are in conflict with the statistical predictions of quantum 
mechanics. This is done by showing that if the wavefunction were epistemic, then it 
would require the existence of certain relations which are mathematically impossible. 
Therefore, it is argued, if quantum mechanics is empirically adequate, then the 
wavefunction must be ontic: it must objectively describe either a fact about matter, or a 
 
(Suàrez 2015). Finally, structuralist accounts seem at the moment to be underdeveloped or too vague, as it 
is unclear what structure is in this context. 
25 Epistemic approaches can be distinguished into neo-Copenhagen accounts, and hidden variables ones. 
Einstein’s original statistical interpretation (1949) is an example of a hidden variable epistemic approach. 
In fact, it states that quantum theory is fundamentally incomplete, as it does not specify hidden variables 
describing the reality under the phenomena, whose behavior is statistically well described by the 
wavefunction. For a more modern approach, see Spekkens (2007). In contrast, the neo-Copenhagen 
approaches reject that the above-mentioned hidden variables exist or are needed. Traces of this can be 
found for example in Heisenberg (1958). Neo-Copenhagen approaches include the information-theoretic 
approach (Bub and Pitowsky 2010, Bub 2015), Bayesian approaches (Fuchs 2010), and relational ones 
(Rovelli 1996). See Dunlap (2015) for a comparison between the primitive ontology approach and the 
information-theoretic interpretation. 
26 Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2012). 
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nomological fact. These objections have been subject to an extensive examination, and 
proponents of epistemic approaches have provided several replies, which however in 
the eyes of many are still tentative.27  
 
Usually, these approaches are regarded as instrumentalist, given that they give a central 
role to measurements outcomes. So, it may seem pointless that I even consider them 
here. However, some of these interpretations, most notably the information-theoretic 
interpretation of quantum theory, explicitly claim to provide a fully realist account of 
the quantum world.28 The idea is that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about 
measurement outcomes, whose statistics are recovered by the constraints that Hilbert 
space structure imposes on the quantum dynamics.  
 
Notice that this type of approach is explanatory in a distinctive way: it explains by 
systematizing the phenomena using general principles, in a kinematic way. An example of 
such a principle explanation is the explanation of heat phenomena by thermodynamics: 
thermodynamics uses principles such as “energy cannot be created or destroyed” and 
“entropy always increases” to determine what can or cannot happen.  This way of 
explaining is in contrast with the type of explanation favored by the proponents of the 
primitive ontology approach, for instance. As discussed in the previous subsection, the 
primitive ontology explanation is compositional and dynamical: macroscopic objects 
are made of the microscopic entities the primitive ontology describes, and their 
behavior is recovered dynamically, in terms of a some sort of reductive or constructive 
explanation, like the one provided by kinetic theory for thermodynamics. In other 
words, realist epistemic interpretations do not provide a dynamical (or a causal) 
mechanism to explain. Rather, they claim to be explanatory by being able to account 
and predict which phenomena can occur in terms of principles: just as a melted piece of 
ice cannot re-freeze because it is forbidden by the second principle of thermodynamics 
according to which entropy always increases, in quantum mechanics we have 
interference under a given set of circumstances because this is what the quantum rules 
prescribe. To use a terminology introduced by Einstein (1919), there is a distinction 
between constructive and principle theories: constructive theories involve a dynamical 
reduction of macroscopic objects in terms of their microscopic, fundamental, 
constituents, while principle theories are formulated in terms of principles used to 
constrain physically possible processes. While the primitive ontology approach is built 
to provide constructive explanations, epistemic interpretations are principle theories. 
 
27 See Leifer (2014), Gao (2017), Maudlin (2019), and references therein, for a discussion of objections and 
replies. 




Because of this, the latter offer reasons why one should expect a phenomenon to happen, 
while the former provides the reasons why the phenomenon happens.29 
This leads us straightforwardly to the next interesting view, namely pragmatist 
quantum realism, which shares the same attitude on explanation as the epistemic 
approaches.  
 
2.4 Pragmatist Quantum Realism: The Wavefunction Prescribes Expectations 
According to pragmatist quantum realism the wavefunction is prescriptive rather than 
descriptive: physical systems are not described by the wavefunction, which instead tells 
us what we should believe about a given physical situation.30 This view is pragmatist in 
the sense that the wavefunction is not some entity to ‘reify’ or materialize.  
Instead, in contrast with epistemic interpretations and with the primitive ontology 
program, in this approach the wavefunction is to be understood in terms of the roles, or 
functions, it has from our perspectives. The wavefunction provides objective 
‘information bridges’ which concisely summarize what happens and enable us to make 
predictions about what to expect will happen next.  Thus, the wavefunction has the role 
of explaining the phenomena in the specific sense that it explains why experimenters 
are justified in believing something will or will not happen. In the terminology 
introduced in the previous subsection, pragmatist quantum realism is a principle theory: 
the Born rule assigns phenomena probabilities of happening, and these probabilities 
express our degrees of belief that a given phenomenon will happen. In this respect, 
pragmatist quantum realism is similar to the epistemic interpretations. However, 
epistemic approaches may be thought of as pragmatic, rather than pragmatist, in that 
they prioritize recovering the empirical data, and assign a fundamental role to 
measurement results, while pragmatist quantum realism does not do that.31  Moreover, 
by defining the wavefunction in terms of its explanatory role, the pragmatist provides a 
characterization of the wavefunction which is not epistemic. Rather, it is objective in 
such a way that, arguably, pragmatist quantum realism does not fall prey of the PBR 
theorem, in contrast with the epistemic interpretations.32   
 
29  For more on the constructive/principle distinction in this context, see Bub and Pitowski (2010). Also, for 
a more general discussion of this distinction, see Flores (1999), Balashov and Janssen (2003), Brown and 
Pooley (2004), Brown (2005), Brown and Timpson (2006), Felline (2011), van Camp (2011).  
30 Healey (2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2020) and references therein. See also Friederich (2015). 
31 A pragmatist view is one in which, as held by the pragmatist school of philosophy, to understand a 
concept, such as the wavefunction, is to understand its functions, rather than what it represents. Instead a 
view can be called pragmatic when it focuses on the macroscopic domain, aiming at reproducing our 
experiences, rather than providing the microscopic description giving rise to the macroscopic data. I 
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.  
32 Notice the PBR theorem proves that the wavefunction has to be non-epistemic. Traditionally this has 




This view provides a non-material, non-epistemic, non-representational account of the 
wavefunction based on a particular understanding of explanation. It is therefore similar 
to the primitive ontology program in that it focuses on explanation and non-materiality 
of the wavefunction. However, there are at least two differences. First, in the primitive 
ontology approach the wavefunction is still representational, of a nomological rather 
than a material fact, while in pragmatist quantum realism the wavefunction completely 
ceases to be defined in these terms. Second, the two views differ in what they consider a 
satisfactory explanation. As anticipated, while the primitive ontologists favor a 
dynamical, compositional approach based on a constructive understanding of theories, 
pragmatists instead agree with epistemicists that principle theories are enough to 
provide satisfactory explanations: no constructive (dynamical and compositional) 
explanation is needed. These accounts explain by providing principles which limit the 
possible phenomena, just like thermodynamics explain heat phenomena. By stating that 
“gases expand when heated” one explains why this gas expands in the sense that, if I 
perform an experiment heating this gas, I expect it to expand.  Still, people have pushed 
back against this attitude, maintaining that only constructive theories, which provide 
the reasons why a phenomenon obtains, are truly explanatory: I need to explain what 
heating is, and what in this gas makes it expand when heated. Otherwise, I merely have 
a description, and not an understanding of the phenomenon.33   
Therefore, one may wonder whether it is possible to reconcile the desire of having a 
non-material, non-representational, ontic wavefunction as pragmatist quantum realism 
maintains, with the constructive explanation provided by the nomological approach. In 
the next section I propose a view which is aimed at combining these desiderata, with 




something independently of any observer. Nonetheless, the epistemic-ontic distinction so understood is a 
false dichotomy, as it is not necessarily the case that if the wavefunction is not epistemic has to be ontic in 
this way. In fact, the following are all possible state of affairs: 1) the wavefunction represents a physical 
object (as wavefunction realism proposes); 2) the wavefunction represents a nomological fact (as the 
primitive ontologists claim); but also 3) the wave function is defined in terms of the functions it plays in 
the theory. While in the first two cases the wavefunction is ontic strictly speaking (being 
representational), in the third option the wavefunction is non-representational, but nonetheless it is non-
epistemic. This fact alone allows to bypass the PBR theorem.  
33 See e.g. Jansson (2020), Lewis (2020) and references therein for criticisms, and Healey (2020) for a 
defense. See also Brown and Timpson (2006) for a criticism of the information-theoretic interpretation as 
not explanatory.  
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As I have discussed above, the issue is to find an effective way of thinking about the 
wavefunction as non-representational, non-epistemic, but also constructively explanatory. The 
nomological view helps with the explanatory part, but it does not provide a non-
representational wavefunction, while pragmatist quantum realism helps with that, but 
it has the wrong explanatory framework. So, my proposal is a blended view, which 
suitably combines some ingredients of the approaches discussed in the previous section 
as to provide several advantages over each of them, while preserving their core 
motivations. I call my approach wave-functionalism because it defines the wavefunction 
in terms of its roles in the theory: the wavefunction is whatever functions it plays.  
In this section I articulate this view. In the first subsection I briefly review functionalism 
in general, and sketch how one can use a similar strategy in the case of the 
wavefunction. Then, in Section 3.2 I discuss the roles the wavefunction in quantum 
theory. In the last two subsections I show how, by focusing on these roles rather than 
trying to define what the wavefunction represents, I can avoid the main obstacles of the 
approaches discussed above. 
  
3.1 Functionalism: The Wavefunction is as the Wavefunction Does  
Functionalism, broadly speaking, is the view that certain entities can be defined in 
terms of their functional roles. To use a powerful slogan, ‘the table is as the table does.’34 
Strategies with a functionalist core have been used in the philosophy of mind for a long 
time.35 In this context, by defining mental states in term of their functional roles, they 
can be realized by different physical systems. Mental states are reduced to their 
functions or may be thought of as non-fundamental but suitably emergent from 
physical states.  
 
Recently functionalist approaches have been used in philosophy of physics as well.  For 
instance, Knox (2013, 2014) argues that spacetime can be functionalized in the classical 
theory of gravity. That is, spacetime can be thought of as non-fundamental (emergent) 
in virtue of the fact that spacetime plays the role of defining inertial frames. Moreover 
Albert (2015) defends wavefunction realism using his own brand of functionalism. He 
argues that ordinary three-dimensional objects emerge by functional reduction: they are 
functionalized in terms of their causal roles, and the wavefunction dynamically uses 
these relations to give rise to the empirical evidence.36 Lam and Wüthrich (2018) use 
functionalist strategies in quantum gravity. A common feature of the different 
approaches to quantum gravity is that spacetime is not fundamental but it is 
 
34 Or, as Forrest Gump’s mother used to say: “Stupid is as stupid does.” 
35 Starting from Putnam (1960). 
36 Ney (forthcoming) provides a criticism and discusses her own alternative.  
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functionally emergent from non-spatiotemporal structures.37 Lam and Wüthrich argue 
that, in order for spacetime to emerge, it is sufficient to recover only those features 
which are functionally relevant in producing observations. Several objections have been 
raised against this view,38 one of which is common with wavefunction realism, namely 
the problem of empirical incoherence. A theory is said to be empirically incoherent in 
case its truth undermines our empirical justification for believing it to be true. 
Arguably, any theory gets confirmation by spatiotemporal observations. However, a 
theory which rejects spacetime as fundamental entails that its fundamental entities are 
not spatiotemporal. Because of this, our observations are not observations at all, and 
thus provide no evidence for the theory in the first place. 39 
 
My idea, on which wave-functionalism is based, is to use functionalist strategies not 
applied to space, time, or spacetime, but to the wavefunction. In the rest of this section I 
am going to argue that my view is compatible with the non-material approaches to the 
wavefunction, such as the primitive ontology program, the epistemic interpretations, 
and pragmatist quantum realism. In particular, pragmatist quantum realism can be seen 
as having functionalist components: the wavefunction is understood in terms of the 
function it plays in the theory, namely prescribing the experimenter’s expectations in a 
given experimental situation. Wave-functionalism is more general than that, as it is 
compatible with a more ‘robust’ type of explanation: as I elaborate below, I identify 
other roles for the wavefunction which interconnect with one another as to providing a 
constructive (dynamical and compositional) explanation able to giving us the reasons 
why a given phenomenon happens.  
 
To sum up, along the lines of pragmatist quantum realism, I start from the idea the 
wavefunction is not to be understood in terms of what it represents. We should look 
neither for material facts (like wavefunction realists propose), nor for nomological facts 
(contra the primitive ontology approach). Nor we should look at the wavefunction as 
describing incomplete knowledge (in contrast with epistemic interpretations). Rather, 
the wavefunction is an objective ingredient of the theory, which is functionally defined 
in terms of the roles it plays. I show that by functionalizing the wavefunction in this 
way one can capture the intuitions that the wavefunction is law-like (as in nomological 
approaches), avoiding the problems of time-dependence and non-uniqueness. Also, one 
 
37 For a review of spacetime emergence in quantum gravity see e.g., Huggett and Wüthrich (2013, 
forthcoming), Crowther, (2016), Le Bihan and Linnemann (2019), and references therein. 
38 For a discussion on the role of functionalism in the emergence of spacetime, see Le Bihan (forthcoming). 
See also Lam and Esfeld (2013), and Yates (forthcoming).  
39 Barrett (1999), Maudlin (2007) and Ney (2015) discuss the issue of empirical incoherence in the 
framework of quantum mechanics, while Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) address it in quantum gravity. 
For related considerations, see also Healey (2002).    
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can understand how the wavefunction can be non-material (as in epistemic approaches) 
but ontic, therefore bypassing no-go theorems. Then, one can make the wavefunction 
non-representational (like the pragmatists) without being committed to thinking of it as 
merely predicting expectations.  
 
3.2 The Functions of the Wavefunction  
So, what are the functions of the wavefunction which one may use to functionalize it? I 
think that one can identify the following different but interconnected roles which 
however all contribute to the same goal: to effectively reproduce the empirical data in an 
explanatory way.  
 
First and foremost, there is an empirical role: the wavefunction contributes to providing 
whatever is needed to adequately recover the measurement results. Notice that this 
does not mean necessarily that one has to give a special status to measurement 
processes, experimental outcomes, or observers, like epistemic interpretations do. In 
fact, this empirical role merely refers to the fact that the wavefunction is one of the 
ingredients which allow to make predictions and to provide explanations. If one thinks 
of a theory as a black box which produces empirical predictions, the wavefunction is 
part of the machinery inside of the box that produces these predictions. This is what the 
wavefunction does also in the primitive ontology approach and in pragmatist quantum 
realism, neither of which is, strictly speaking, empiricist in this way. In executing this 
role, the wavefunction performs a practical role in a pragmatic way.  In fact, the 
wavefunction generates the probability outcomes by being part of the Born rule, but one 
could choose another object for this role. For instance, one could generate the same 
probability distributions using another wavefunction which differs from the first by a 
phase.40 Or, one could express the Born rule in terms of the density matrix. Or, more 
exotically, consider theories like the pilot-wave theory and the spontaneous collapse 
theory, which are originally defined respectively in terms of a Schrödinger-evolving 
wavefunction and a wavefunction which spontaneously and randomly collapses. One 
can show that it is possible to write two theories, respectively empirically equivalent to 
the pilot-wave theory and the spontaneous collapse theory, in terms of a ‘collapsing’ 
wavefunction and a Schrödinger evolving one.41  For all practical and explanatory 
purposes, they are equivalent reformulations of the same theory, as they produce the 
very same empirical predictions, and explain the phenomena in the same way. The fact 
that quantum mechanics is formulated in terms of a Schrödinger-evolving 
wavefunction is purely pragmatic, as it is contingent to other super-empirical 
 
40 Indeed, the wavefunction is as a ray in Hilbert space, namely an equivalence class of objects which 
differ from a phase, because each element in the class generates the same empirical results.  
41 Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka, and Zanghì (2008).  
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considerations like for example simplicity and explanatory power: it is the simplest and 
most explanatory choice one could have made.  
 
This empirical role alone is enough to guarantee that the wavefunction is able to explain 
why experiments are justified in believing in a set of experimental outcomes. That is, 
this empirical role is the only one needed in epistemic and pragmatist approaches. 
However, if one wishes to have an explanation of why these results obtain in terms of a 
constructive theory, as the primitive ontologist would (see subsection 2.2), one needs to 
identify other roles for the wavefunction. For one, the wavefunction has a nomological 
role. This is straightforward for the primitive ontology approach, in which the 
wavefunction governs the motion of the primitive ontology.42 In the case of the 
epistemic approaches the dynamics does not plays much of a role, but the wavefunction 
can be seen as nomological in the sense that it takes part in the definition of the 
principles which characterize which phenomena actually happen. Similarly, according 
to the pragmatists, the nomological role is to provide ‘information bridges’ which 
describe the phenomena by concisely summarizing what happens.43   
 
As the discussion above shows, by playing this nomological role, the wavefunction also 
executes its explanatory role: it is a necessary ingredient to account for the experimental 
results. In what way the wavefunction explains, whether constructively or in terms of 
principles depends on the type framework (see again subsection 2.2). In the primitive 
ontology approach the wavefunction is part of the ingredients necessary to define the 
dynamics for the primitive ontology, and in this way accounts for the empirical data 
compositionally and dynamically, as macroscopically produced by the ‘trajectories’ of 
the microscopic primitive ontology. That is, the explanation is constructive. In the 
epistemic and pragmatist interpretations the wavefunction provides the statistics of the 
measurement outcomes via the Born rule, therefore explaining the probabilistic data by 
imposing kinematical constraints on the possible phenomena, and by therefore 
predicting what an experimenter should expect. Accordingly, they are principle 
theories. 
 
These roles combine together to define the wavefunction functionally: the wavefunction 
is whatever functions it plays in the theory. This is similar to the functionalist 
approaches discussed at the beginning of subsection 3.1: in order to account for 
observations, it is sufficient to recover only those features which are functionally 
relevant in producing the empirical evidence in an explanatory manner. As anticipated, 
 
42 In the context of the pilot-wave theory, the wavefunction can be taken as a force or a potential, but one 
does not think of it as material either (even if Belousek 2003 argues otherwise).  
43 Healey (2017a).  
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this can be done either constructively, in terms of the dynamics of the primitive 
ontology, or using Hilbert space principles or quantum rules to systematize the 
phenomena. 
 
3.3 Further Characterizations 
As we just saw, wave-functionalism captures many of the motivations of the 
interpretations in which the wavefunction is considered non-material. In this subsection 
I further explore the view, and in the next subsection I show how wave-functionalism 
does not fall prey of the major objections of the alternative views. Before doing that, let 
me make a couple of remarks.  
 
First, in this view the wavefunction is an ingredient in the law, rather than a law itself. 
Depending on the approach considered, laws of nature systematize the phenomena, 
prescribe matter how to move, and/or tell experimenters what to expect. When we write 
down laws in physics books, we use different symbols and mathematical entities. Some 
of these symbols describe constants of nature. Some others are variables, some of which 
represent masses and charges, for instance, and some others represent potentials. 
Among these variables there is also the wavefunction: as such, it is one of the 
ingredients a law must possess in order to ‘carry out’ the tasks mentioned above. Just 
like constants and potentials, the wavefunction is a part of the law: it is one of the 
pieces, one of the ingredients present in the law. To use a not entirely adequate analogy, 
one could say that a natural law is similar to a birthday cake. The function of a birthday 
cake is to make the birthday boy or girl happy, and to fulfil its role the cake needs its 
ingredients, each of which has its own function. Sugar is to sweeten, while flour, butter 
and egg serve to provide structure to the compound and to amalgamate it. Similarly, a 
law has the role of governing the motion of physical bodies and/or systematizing the 
phenomena. To do that, it needs ingredients. Each ingredient has its function, and they 
all combine to allow the law to fulfil its role. The wavefunction looks more similar to 
potentials than to any other ingredients in the law, in the fact that they both 
conveniently express the interaction and the motion of matter.44 This is the sense in 
which the wavefunction is part of the law: it encodes part of what is needed to fulfil its 
nomological role. In a language that is more common in functionalist approaches, one 
may say that the wavefunction partially realizes the law.  
 
Second, the wavefunction is only one of the possible realizers of the functions mentioned in 
the previous section. So, there is a sense in which I should say not that the wavefunction 
is functionalized, but rather the ingredient of the law the wavefunction realizes is 
 
44 Indeed, at least initially, the pilot-wave theory was described in terms of the quantum potential, 
containing the wavefunction, and acting on matter, made of particles, as another interaction. 
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functionalized. To understand, continue with the cake analogy. Some ingredients in the 
cake may not be indispensable, in the sense that their function may be multiply 
realized: white sugar can be substituted by cane sugar; flour with starch, butter with 
margarine, eggs with just yolk. Likewise, the different ingredients in the law, among 
which there is the wavefunction, may be multiply realized: one could use other 
mathematical objects and still realize the same functions. In classical physics one can 
write Newton’s equation in terms of the gravitational field, or in terms of the 
gravitational potential: they fulfil the same role. Similarly, in quantum theory one could 
write the Born rule using this wavefunction, or the same wavefunction shifted by a 
phase, or a density matrix, or whatnot, since all these objects realize the same functions. 
 
Finally, wave-functionalism is not reductionist in the sense that the realizers (the 
wavefunction and the other ingredients in the law) needs to be specified over and above 
the distribution of matter in the world. This is equivalent to say that God, at the 
beginning of time, created the world, including its laws. The laws contain the necessary 
ingredients that allows them to play their nomological role, whatever one may think it 
is. One way of conveniently realize the various functions is in terms of the 
wavefunction, but that is not the only way, as we have seen.  
 
3.4 Advantages over the Alternatives  
Now let me consider how my view solves the problems of the alternative approaches 
about the nature of the wavefunction, starting from the nomological approach. In wave-
functionalism, as we have just seen, the wavefunction is an ingredient of the law. 
Because of that, unlike in the case of the nomological approach which considers the 
wavefunction itself as a law of nature, here the wavefunction does not have to be 
unique, like potentials are not unique: as a potential is an equivalence class of objects 
which differ by a constant, the wavefunction is an equivalence class of objects which 
differ by a phase. Since they both give rise to the same phenomena (macroscopic and 
microscopic), they are equivalent, for all practical and explanatory purposes. Moreover, 
in wave-functionalism it does not matter whether the wavefunction evolves in time or 
not: this is a problem only if one thinks the wavefunction in itself is a law, while in this 
case it is merely part of the mechanism that generates what we observe and which we 
want to explain. As in classical physics sometimes we need time-dependent potentials, 
in quantum theory we need a wavefunction which evolves in time. Thus, to sum up, the 
wavefunction plays a nomological role but it is not itself a law, therefore avoiding the 
objections of the nomological view. 
 
Wave-functionalism shares with the epistemic view the idea that the wavefunction does 
not represent matter. However, in my view the wavefunction is not epistemic: it does 
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not represent the incomplete knowledge of a system. Rather, the wavefunction is 
functionally defined in terms of the roles it plays in the theory, mainly to recover the 
experimental data in an efficient and explanatory manner. As such, the wavefunction is 
objective, as it exists independently of the existence of observers and their minds. As a 
consequence, the wavefunction is ontic, and wave-functionalism does not fall prey of 
the PBR theorem.   
 
Then, wave-functionalism overcomes the challenge, faced by pragmatist quantum 
realism, of not being sufficiently explanatory. The problem was that both pragmatism 
and epistemic views are explanatory only in a weak sense, as they account for why 
experimenters are justified in expecting some phenomenon without spelling out why 
the phenomenon actually takes place. Conversely, if someone wishes to know what 
caused the phenomenon, or what grounds it, or what is the mechanics that produces it, 
they will be left unsatisfied by these approaches. Instead wave-functionalism is more 
general because it is not committed to this conception of explanation. In fact, one could 
understand the explanatory role of the wavefunction dynamically and compositionally, 
in terms of a constructive explanation, as the primitive ontologists do: the wavefunction 
is part of the dynamical law which governs the microscopic entities and reproduces the 
macroscopic observed behavior. In fact, consider for example the interference-
diffraction pattern produced in a two-slit experiment. One can explain it in two ways. 
First, one can say that the dots are distributed the way they are because they follow the 
pattern dictated by the square module of the wavefunction. This is compatible with 
wave-functionalism and it is a principle theory explanation: the wavefunction plays the 
role of constraining the observed phenomena and tells us where to expect the dots. This 
is also what the pragmatist would say. Moreover, within wave-functionalism, one can 
also say that the reason why the dots are where they are is because the wavefunction is 
part of the law governing the motion of matter, as the primitive ontologists would say. 
In other words, wave-functionalism is more flexible than pragmatist quantum realism 
because while pragmatist quantum realism is compatible with only the principle type of 
explanation, wave-function realism is compatible with both, as it is also able to 
accommodate constructive explanations.45 
 
As a side remark, let me notice that wave-functionalism also avoids the main problems 
of wavefunction realism, namely the configuration space problem and the problem of 
empirical incoherence. In fact, both problems arise when there is a mismatch between 
the space of our observations and the fundamental space postulated by the theory, like 
in wavefunction realism and quantum gravity. However, since in wave-functionalism 
the wavefunction is not representational, there is never a reason to introduce a 
 
45 See also subsection 3.5, objection 4.  
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fundamental space which is different from ordinary three-dimensional space. Hence, 
these problems never arise.  
 
3.5 Possible Objections and Replies 
In this section I anticipate some objections to wave-functionalism. Some of them stem 
from misunderstandings of my position, so the replies I offer may also serve to clarify 
the view.  
 
1. Is the wavefunction functionally reduced? What are its functional realizers? 
Elaboration. Functionalist approaches are typically reductionist about the object with 
gets functionalized. For instance, mental states do not exist over and above physical 
states. In Albert’s functionalism, three-dimensional objects are not postulated to exist 
over and above the wavefunction. In wave-functionalism the wavefunction is reduced 
to its roles. Does that mean that the wavefunction does not exist over and above the 
distribution of matter? Or, in the case of epistemic or pragmatist interpretations, over 
and above the distribution of the empirical outcomes or the experimenter’s 
expectations? That seems wrong: one needs to postulate the wavefunction over and 
above them.  
Moreover, by focusing on the functions and not the representation, functionalism in the 
philosophy of mind allows mental states may be multiply realized. For instance, they 
are realized in humans by brain states, while they could be realized by positronic 




Functionalism does not need to entail reduction, as it is consistent also with elimination, 
and dualism about the realizers. Wave-functionalism is not reductionist, as the 
wavefunction (or any other realizer) has to be specified in addition to the material 
ontology, and this usually done specifying the laws.  
As discussed in subsection 3.3, what is functionalized is the ingredient in the law which 
the wavefunction happens to realize. That is, the wavefunction is one of the possible 
realizers, another realizer could be a wavefunction with a different phase, or a density 
matrix.  
 
2. Why do we need this view in addition to the primitive ontology approach, pragmatism and 
epistemicism? 
Elaboration. Wave-functionalism is seen as an alternative to these various proposals. But 
why do we even need this alternative? In all likelihood, primitive ontologists will see no 
need for it, as they believe that the problems to the nomological view are not serious. 
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Similarly, the proponents of the epistemic and pragmatist interpretations have replies to 
their respective challenges: they have put forward ways out from the no-go theorems 
and advocate that principle theories provide satisfactory explanations.  So, who needs 
this view?  
 
Reply: 
It is indeed very possible that purists of these approaches may not be moved by wave-
functionalism, as they may insist that the problems of their views are less severe than I 
have made them. Likewise, consider an empiricist, or someone who cares about 
accurately reproducing the data without feeling the necessity of specifying some 
microscopic mechanisms to constructively explain these data (like the epistemicists), 
but who is bothered by the epistemic character of the wavefunction typical of these 
approaches. They can become pragmatists, and, since they are not preoccupied by the 
type of explanation proposed by principle theories, they will find little interest in wave-
functionalism. However, my purpose is to explore whether one could ‘have it all,’ so to 
speak. For example, if someone is moved by the objections to the nomological view but 
they do not want to move to wavefunction realism (because they find the configuration 
space problem to be serious), or to epistemicism (because they also find the no-go 
theorem to be challenging), or to pragmatism (because they would like to have the 
constructive explanations), what options have they got left? Wave-functionalism is 
proposed for people like this.  Wave-functionalism relaxes the original ontic 
nomological view, which is still representational, to make it functionally non-
representational, preserving its constructive explanation. Also, consider someone who 
thinks that both primitive ontologists and empiricists are wrong in thinking of the 
wavefunction as representing something (as the pragmatists), but they are bothered by 
the type of explanation principle theories provide. Wave-functionalism gives them an 
option: the wavefunction is functionally defined, and therefore it is non-
representational, but being part of the law and of the constructive, dynamic explanatory 
schema there is no worry about explanation.   
 
3. What does it mean that the wavefunction is a part of the law?  
Elaboration. Laws do not have parts or ingredients, laws are laws: they either govern the 
phenomena or they describe them in a Humean fashion or are used to constrain the 
phenomena.  The notion of parthood as applied to laws is mysterious. Therefore, the 
approach trades one mystery (the wavefunction is a time-dependent, non-unique law) 
for another (the wavefunction is part of the law), hiding all the problems into a 





Laws of nature are what they are, but when we write them down in physics books, we 
use different symbols and mathematical entities, including constants of nature, masses, 
charges, the wavefunction, and the potentials. All these ingredients are necessary for 
the law to play its role, which is understood differently by the various proposals. As 
emphasized above, the ingredient realized by the wavefunction could be realized by 
other mathematical objects. Therefore, in a nutshell, to say that the wavefunction is part 
of the law means that it is one of the possible realizers of certain functions which appear 
in the law. 
 
Follow up:  
This seems to imply that whenever one writes the law in terms of different realizers or 
different ingredients, one has a new law, and thus a new theory. For instance, the pilot-
wave theory written in terms of the guidance equation and the pilot-wave theory 
written in terms of the quantum potential would come out as different theories because 
they have different ingredients in the law. This seems wrong.  
 
Reply:  
They are not different theories because they do not have different laws. The two 
examples express two different ways of writing the same law in terms of different 
realizers. Even if one writes the law in terms of different realizers, the law is still the 
same, if its content remains untouched. That is, the law is still the same as long as it 
generates the same behavior for matter, systematizes the phenomena in the same way, 
or prescribes agents to have certain beliefs. As already mentioned, the law is what it is, 
but one can write it differently: one can write Newton’s equation with a given potential, 
and also with the same potential with an additional constant. The (partial) nomological 
content of the wavefunction can be encoded in the quantum potential, or in something 
else. What is essential is what the wavefunction encodes or realizes, rather than the fact 
that it is encoded or realized in the wavefunction, as opposed in something else. One 
does not need the wavefunction in itself: it is just one of the possible realizers of the 
various functions. This should not sound particularly strange from a Humean 
perspective, because in this view laws are merely convenient summaries which God 
would write on a T-shirt for our benefit. Some Humean approaches do not seem 
committed to reifying the wavefunction or any other symbol or variable in the laws, 
and this is exactly what I am proposing here.46 
 
46 I have in mind Esfeld's super-Humeanism (2014), or Bhogal and Perry's version of Humeanism (2017). 
They relax the condition, proper of the more traditional Lewisian Humeans, that fundamental laws 
should mention only perfectly natural properties in the Humean mosaic. Lewisians instead may resist 
this view. In fact, their best system would include the Schrödinger equation as an axiom, and this would 
mention the wavefunction, which therefore should be part of the Humean mosaic.  




4. How can wave-functionalism be explanatory if the wavefunction does not materially exist? 
Elaboration. In the history of science, people have postulated the existence of new 
entities to explain new data: neutrinos, electromagnetic fields, dark matter, and so on. 
Arguably, the wavefunction was introduced in quantum theory for the same reason: to 
explain, say, the double-slit experiment. However, if wave-functionalism claims that the 
wavefunction does not represent anything in the world, how is it possible that it is able 
to explain the phenomena?  
 
Reply:  
Pragmatist quantum realists face the same challenge, and their defenders respond that 
they have a different idea about what explanation requires: this interpretation does not 
explain by providing a description of the physical world but rather by providing 
reasons to expect certain experimental data. In any case, I do not see the reason to think 
that all the ingredients in an explanation needs to be physically real. Historically, 
electromagnetic fields were initially considered to be useful bookkeeping devices, 
without taking them as material fields. One could have raised the very same objection 
in that context, but instead no one complained that classical electrodynamics was not 
explanatory. I believe they thought that theory was nonetheless explanatory because, 
even if the electromagnetic fields were understood as mere fictions, they were still 
carrying a piece of the relevant nomological information needed to the law to generate 
the empirically adequate behavior. In other words, people were realist about laws, or 
nomological facts, rather than about their individual ingredients. This is what wave-
functionalism proposes: it is in virtue of the fact that the law exists, rather than the 
wavefunction in particular, that the view is explanatory.     
 
5. How can wave-functionalism solve the configuration space problem if it postulates 
nomological facts in configuration space? 
Elaboration. Think about the double-slit experiment. The wavefunction realist has a 
ready explanation: there is a physical wave crossing both slits which therefore creates 
two waves which generate the interference and diffraction pattern on the screen. The 
epistemicist has more problems: if the wavefunction represent incomplete knowledge of 
the system, how is it that it generates a physical phenomenon? Wave-functionalism 
could explain two-slit interference in terms of the wavefunction though as a potential, 
but it would have to be defined over configuration space. If so, it looks like one has to 
privilege configuration space as the appropriate arena for that law to operate in. If part 
of the motivation for wave-functionalism is to avoid appeals to configuration space, 





I think it is the main innovation of quantum mechanics that configuration space has to 
enter one way or another, and this is because quantum nonlocality seems to be a fact of 
nature. So, everyone will have to deal with this. Wave-functionalism says that there are 
non-local nomological facts encoded in, or realized by, the wavefunction. This is not 
ideal, but it does not seem to be as problematical as saying that there is a physical 
ontology in configuration space. In fact, I perceive material bodies to be in three-
dimensional space more directly that the way I ‘perceive’ laws: I only see their indirect 
effect through the motion of the material bodies. So, I seem more justified in saying that 
the material bodies are three-dimensional than in saying that the law is. Therefore, it 
seems more problematical to say that these bodies are in configuration space, rather 
than to say that the law is. Moreover, especially from a Humean perspective, it is easier 
to make sense of the law being in configuration space, rather than physical objects. In 
fact, a law in configuration space is one in which the interaction is more complex and 
interconnected than originally thought. Instead, as the various approaches developed 
by wavefunction realists have shown, it is much more convoluted to spell out what it 
means for a physical body to ‘vibrate’ in configuration space. Because of this I think 
that, since everyone has to deal with configuration space one way or the other, wave-
functionalism, by inserting it in the law rather than in the material ontology, choses the 
best route compatible with the nonlocality of quantum theory.    
4 Conclusion 
 
Wave-functionalism, the view proposed in this paper, claims that the wavefunction is 
defined functionally: the wavefunction is whatever functions it plays in the theory.  
These are the several distinctive but connected roles the wavefunction may play in the 
theory:  
1) An empirical role, in that the wavefunction is an essential ingredient in 
reproducing the experimental results;  
2) A nomological role, in that the wavefunction is one of the ingredients to be 
specified in the law;  
3) An explanatory role, in that the wavefunction plays a crucial part in the 
compositional, dynamical explanatory mechanism of the theory. 
I have argued that in my account the wavefunction, by being functional, may be thought 
as:  
1) Non-epistemic (as the epistemic interpretations) without being material (in contrast 
with wavefunction realism) or nomological (in contrast with the primitive 
ontology approach);  
2) Non-material without being representational (as pragmatists quantum realism); 




4) Constructively explanatory (as the primitive ontology approach). 
By ensuring all these features, wave-functionalism is able to avoid the major objections 
of the competing approaches. In fact:  
1) By having a nomological role without being a law (that is, given that the wavefunction 
is only one possible realizer), it does not matter whether the wavefunction is time-
evolving, or unique;  
2) By having an explanatory role tied to laws of nature, the wavefunction does not have 
to be wedded to the explanation provided by principle theories; 
3) By being non-representational but also non-epistemic, no-go theorems are bypassed. 
For these reasons, wave-functionalism provides a general understanding of the 
wavefunction that could be adopted by those who have reasons to think that the 
wavefunction does not represent material objects, but also care about an objective, 
constructive, dynamical and compositional explanation of the phenomena.   
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